The Art of War
War is bad. Bad things should be avoided. If avoidance is not possible then it must be well prepared. How?
The oldest written answer to this question was given about 2500 years ago by Sun Tzu — a general, military strategist, writer, and philosopher who lived in the Eastern Zhou period of ancient China — in his prominent book The Art of War.
Recently I had a chance to read an English translation of the book and I was fascinated by the fact that despite a thousand years of a difference the spine of the concept is still valid. Composed of 13 chapters the book is full of subtle thoughts that offering a wide range of ambiguity. Perhaps such a mysterious language adds a flavor to this ancient pearl.
In this short article, I’m sharing with you my most interesting notes from the book.
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Win without fighting. To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is supreme excellence.
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Invincibility lies in the defense, the possibility of victory in the attack. Defend yourself when the enemy’s strength is abundant, and attack the enemy when it is inadequate.
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In ancient times, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. Consequently, a master of war wins victories without showing his brilliant military success, and without gaining the reputation for wisdom or the merit for valor. He wins his victories without making mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means that he conquers an enemy already defeated.
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Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength from compelling the enemy to make these preparations against us.
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He refrains from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order and desists from attacking an army whose formations are in an impressive array. This is the art of assessing circumstances.
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It is a doctrine of war that we must not rely on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to meet him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but on the fact that we have made our position invincible.
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Too frequent rewards indicate that the general is at the end of his resources; too frequent punishments indicate that he is in dire distress.
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